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Canton, that if Shameen is attacked we shall take such steps as we may think fit, but that the actual nature of such steps should not be specified. Also that discretion should be given to him to arrange for a demonstration over Canton by as many aircraft as can be made available at the moment that this com- munication is being conveyed to the Chinese General.
(3.) That if Shameen is attacked, a blockade of Canton and the bombing and shelling of vital points (such as magazines, military establishments, &c.) are among the counter-measures which should be permitted.
(4.) That immediate authority should be given to the Governor and Naval authorities at Hong-Kong for the use of the Kowloon Aerodrome.`
18. The interdiction of the passage of the Yangtse by Cantonese troops, the blockade of South China, both on the Yangtse and at Canton, and of the coast between, are not the sole means by which we can bring pressure to bear on the Nationalist Government. In addition to the above measures it is in our power to seize the Cantonese Navy, a list of which is attached in Appendix (B). These ships possess but little fighting value, and probably some of them are unable to move. Nevertheless, their seizure would be a blow to the prestige of the Nationalist Govern- ment, and would not be likely to promote indignation in North China, which would benefit by our action. In the event of it being decided to exercise pressure on the Cantonese Government we, therefore, recommend the seizure of the Cantonese ships.
19. The steps we have recommended for preventing the Cantonese from crossing the Yangtse should of themselves, if not too long delayed, greatly diminish the risk of occurrences at Peking and Tientsin comparable to those at Hankow and Nanking, It is noticeable that such outrages have, so far, been confined to places occupied by the Cantonese Forces. In view, however, of what has happened elsewhere in China, we cannot exclude the possibility that the Nationalism of the South may spread to the North, and that British interests in Tientsin and even in Peking itself may be exposed to the same sort of danger as in the great cities of South China.
20. As regards these places, we draw attention to the following passage from our Report of the 11th January, 1927 (C.I.D. Paper No. 756-B) :-
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Tientsin. At Tientsin the Allied Forces are sufficient only for the main- tenance of order in times of popular disturbance, and would be in a position of grave danger if exposed to attack by a large organised Chinese force. It is doubtful if we could keep open communications with the Legation at Peking in any grave circumstances. In the event of serious trouble_threatening, reinforcements can only be obtained from Japan. Our Naval Forces cannot co-operate, as Tientsin cannot be reached by water.'
21.
We notice that the British Ambassador at Tokyo, in reporting an interview with the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, states that the Vice-Minister appeared to realise that the defence of Tientsin would fall on the Japanese (Tokyo telegram No. 134, dated the 28th March, 1927). In accordance with the principle already mentioned, we consider that no additional military commitments should be under- taken in North China, and, consequently, notwithstanding Sir Miles Lampson's request for an extra battalion (Peking telegram No. 542), that no further British Forces should be allocated at the present juncture to Tientsin. The Cantonese Forces are still some 400 miles from Tientsin, and we shall be prepared to consider the question again if and when the danger is greater. For the moment, however, we do not wish to go further than to repeat our recommendation that Japan should undertake all military responsibility there.
22. As regards Peking, we consider that His Majesty's Minister must be responsible for withdrawing the Legation if and when he thinks that disturbances are likely to arise which are beyond the capacity of the Legation Guard to deal with.
23. From the above it will be seen that our recommendations amount to this: That Great Britain should be the predominant partner in action on the Yangtse and against Canton, while Japan should be the predominant partner in North China. All the Powers concerned would, of course, place such forces as they have available at the disposal of the dominant partner in either theatre.
24.
<6
In a previous Report we stated that--
The importance of securing international co-operation in any action against China, whether economic or military, cannot be too strongly emphasised. (Report of January 1927, C.I.D. Paper No. 756-B.)
25. We cannot over-state the importance of this recommendation at the present juncture. It is beyond our competence to express opinions regarding the probability of international co-operation. From a purely military point of view, however, it would be highly advantageous if the Powers whose interests are threatened at Shanghai, and some of whom have suffered in common grievous insults and losses at Nanking, could be induced to act together in the manner indicated in this Report. It is obvious that their position in regard to the many problems vis-à-vis the Cantonese which must be settled internationally would be much stronger if they had behind them a basis of united military sanctions. The sanctions we propose are, as already mentioned, comparatively free from the risk of serious losses or bloodshed.
26.
SUMMARY.
Our conclusions and recommendations may be summarised as follows:- (1) Amid many uncertainties and disquieting events, the situation has developed to our advantage, from a military point of view, in so much as south of the Yangtse we have to deal only with the Cantonese, and any pressure we put on them will no longer operate equally on the Northern Chinese, who have not treated us with the same vindictive spirit as have the Southerners.
(2.) Before any steps are taken to put military pressure on the Cantonese, arrangements must be made to complete the withdrawal of British nationals from the Yangtse above Hankow. We recommend that the withdrawal should take place at once in an orderly manner, beginning at the highest point on the river.
(3.) Subject to the views of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, we recommend that at the same time the British gunboats should be withdrawn from the river above Hankow and concentrated at that port. The Naval Commander-in-Chief must make the best arrangement he can in regard to H.M.S. Mantis, which probably draws too much water to pass down the gorges in the present condition of the river.
(4.) We recommend that, before the gunboats are withdrawn, the French. American and Japanese Governments, who also have gunboats above Hankow, should be informed of our intentions.
(5.) If His Majesty's Government wish to put pressure on the Cantonese
Government, the following measures are available to them:-
(a.) If compelled to act alone.-Interruption of the passage of troops across the Yangtse at the railway centres at Hankow and Nanking and elsewhere below Hankow; interruption of purely Chinese traffic on the Yangtse; seizure of the Cantonese fleet; and (if the consent of the Powers can be obtained) a blockade of the Yangtse and of the approaches to Canton. (This is subject to a favourable reply from the Naval Commander-in-Chief regarding the strength of the defences of the Yangtse at Kiangyin.)
(b.) If acting with other Powers. The above, supplemented by a complete blockade and the control of all river traffic on the Yangtse.
(6.) The attack of the Bogue Fort covering the approaches to Canton is not at present recommended, as it would involve the use of troops now at Hong-Kong, but forming part of the Shanghai Defence Force.
(7.) Any new commitment of our land forces in China should be avoided at this
juncture.
(8.) The risk of trouble at Tientsin and Peking should be reduced by the measures proposed above. We do not at present recommend an increase in the British garrison at Tientsin, notwithstanding Sir Miles Lampson's request for an additional Battalion (Peking Telegram No. 542). We [15949]
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